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Graphical Abstract

Highlights:
 The administration of a 68-item biosecurity checklist was done at LBMs in Nigeria and Egypt, scored and analysed for risk factors for HPAI H5N1

No surveyed live bird markets in Nigeria and Egypt qualify for 100% biosecurity compliance and risky behaviour predominates.
 Wild animals trade in the LBMs was a risk factor and routine disinfection of LBMs, hand washing after slaughter and traceability were protective factors  Participatory approach, multidisciplinary team and innovative government intervention will stop continued spread of HPAI H5N1.
Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 remains an emerging zoonotic disease with significant economic, food security and human health impacts (Brown et al., 2015) . African countries (OIE, 2015; FAO, 2015) . Proportions of the H5N1 positive samples in Nigeria (n = 12) and Egypt (n = 152) were market-based or have had links with the live bird markets (LBMs) (Joannis et al., 2008) . Whereas HPAI H5N1 has become endemic in Egypt, its resurgence in recent times have been reported in five African countries and Nigeria continues to report outbreaks in 2016 (OIE, 2016) . While farm-based risk factor analyses and evaluation of biosecurity has been made with regard to HPAI H5N1 in poultry in Africa (Fasina et al., 2011; Metras et al., 2012; Sheta et al., 2014) , market-level evaluation remain largely unexplored. However, previous studies in Asia have confirmed that LBMs played major roles in the introduction, transmission and maintenance in circulation of influenza viruses (Kung et al., 2003; Webster, 2004; Wang et al., 2006; Indriani et al., 2010; Wan et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2015) .
LBMs are suitable vehicles for the rapid dissemination of influenza viruses (including but not limited to H5N1) because of the central role they play in product distributions and the many trade links they have with farms, roads, abattoirs, slaughter slabs, households and many other locations. Patterns of spread have been associated with uncontrolled movement of poultry and poultry products, lack of effective contingency plan to guide the containment, geographical and ecological factors (Rivas et al., 2010; FAO, 2015) . Pagani et al (2008) have earlier recommended the implementation of strict biosecurity measures in Nigerian LBMs to prevent or reduce the risk of infections or disease in poultry operations. Partially implemented and ineffective measures may create conditions that favour the spread of disease agents within the poultry sector (Yupiana et al., 2010) . This study therefore seeks to assess the level of biosecurity compliance and the associated risks of non-compliance and to identify factors that can potentially influence the introduction and spread of HPAI H5N1 in the Nigerian and Egyptian LBMs, the study was conducted in LBMs in Nigeria and Egypt, and this is the report of the findings. were recruited to qualitatively assess the LBMs (Pagani et al., 2008; Anonymous, 2008) . The documents were reviewed with regard to areas suggested for improvement of biosecurity t the LBMs. A comprehensive checklist was developed based on these three criteria: (i) formulated policies and regulations, (ii) facilities at the LBMs, and (iii) tools and equipments at the LBMs. A total of 68 variables were identified and included in the checklist after the removal of duplicates and these were arranged based on the three criteria previously stated to determine and evaluate the level of compliance (Supplementary Table 1 ).
Materials and methods
Checklist development and identification of Live bird markets
Based on the density of LBMs in South-west Nigeria and the geographical spread, a total of 75 influential markets (popular markets with high traffic and turnout of poultry and also patronage) were selected including 24 weekly and 51 daily LBMs randomly distributed within the urban and periurban/rural areas of six states. The daily and weekly LBMs have previously been described (Pagani et al., 2008; Fasina et al., 2016) , and the pretested checklist was used to obtain detailed data in these LBMs. One to two (1-2) questionnaires were administered to respondents per live bird market depending on the size of the market. Respondent were selected based on the fact that they are live bird sellers in the market and fulfil the inclusion criteria of being active as at the time of selection and having been involved in poultry sale for at least five years. The LBMs were selected randomly and at least 10 questionnaires were administered per state. At the time of planning of survey, the northern part of the country was included but was technically difficult to access some parts of northern Nigeria in view of on-going insurgency and because the dynamics of poultry movements, trade and distributions favours the South-west Nigeria LBMs, it was expected that these samples should be representative. (the sampled LBMs in south western Nigeria).
In Egypt, LBMs were selected from five contiguous governorates based on geographic features, trade volumes and human-animal densities rather than outbreak reports (El Masry et al., 2015) , because
Egypt has been declared to be endemically infected with HPAI H5N1 in poultry. Random surveillance reports have identified outbreaks in many of these locations, hence daily and weekly LBMs in Alexandria, Beheira, Kafr El Sheik, Menofyia and Gharbia governorates were randomly selected. The 68 item biosecurity checklists were designed and administered in Arabic in the 80 LBMs in all the five governorates. The questionnaires were translated and administered by trained interviewers (veterinarians and animal health personnels). Informed oral consent (permission) was sought prior to interviews, and at the conclusion of each interview; the completed questionnaires were reviewed by the authors for missing, unclear, or inconsistent responses. A total of 155 questionnaires were administered in all the LBMs in Nigeria and Egypt
Infected LBMs (positive and negative LBM)
The LBMs were confirmed as positive or negative based on the protocol description of Joannis et al., (2008) . Briefly, following suspicion of an infection or outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in poultry at the LBM, a team was sent to assess the outbreak and collect samples (tracheal and cloacal swabs, parenchymatous tissues and sera) from post-mortem carcasses, moribund or freshly killed birds.
Collected samples were dispatched to the central laboratory where virus isolation on embryonated chicken eggs and haemagglutination-inhibition (HI) tests were conducted to determine the virus subtype. In parallel, viral RNA extraction and reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) were carried out on tissue or other samples as described (Joannis et al., 2006) . All negative allantoic fluids on virus isolation were passaged in a second set of embryonated chicken eggs and any samples negative after the second passage was declared negative. For sera, serological assays were done using agar-gel immune-diffusion test (AGID) test using the H5 antigen (Joannis et al., 2006 ).
An LBM was said to be positive, if any of the above test (RT-PCR and or virus isolation, in addition to serology) confirmed an H5N1 virus or genetic material. Where such a positive confirmation could not be established, the LBM was declared as negative.
Study Design and scoring of the checklist
All selected LBMs in Nigeria and Egypt were visited between February and May 2015 (Fig 1a & b) .
The 68-item self-rated biosecurity checklist was scored in the following way: observed biosecurity compliance level is non-existent to very poor (0-25% = 1); very poor to poor (26-50% = 2); poor to good (51-75% = 3) and good to very good (≥ 75% = 4). These scores were based on the modification of the qualitative scores given by Pagani et al., (2008) . For any item to be scored as "being complied with", it must obtain a score of "4", and for the purpose of statistical analysis, all score below "4" that is (1-3) were made equal to 0, while scores greater than or equal to "4" was assigned a score of 1. A complete list of the items is available in Tables 1, 2, 3 and Supplementary Table  1 .
Statistical analyses
All scores were entered into Microsoft Excel® (Microsoft Redmond, USA) and translated into codes suitable for analyses in the Intercooled Stata 9.0 for Windows (StataCorp, College Station, Texas, USA), and analyzed using descriptive statistical program for proportions. The dichotomic data were also subjected to logistic regression to model the odds of being an HPAI H5N1 case as a function of investigated adherence or lack thereof of the biosecurity factors. Initial screening of potential risk factors for HPAI H5N1 infection was performed by use of univariable logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) . Co-linearity of the independent variables and interaction among them were checked during the model building process using Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as 
Results
The overall results show that no single LBM passed the entire 68-item checklist in the surveyed locations and no significant difference obtained between the peri-urban/rural and urban markets.
However between the daily and weekly markets, some differences in compliance levels were seen and these are documented in Figure 2 . The weekly LBMs performed better than the daily LBMs (p < 0.05). 
Compliance with policy and regulation-related biosecurity
Almost all of the items under policy and regulation-related biosecurity compliance were poor in all the LBMs in Nigeria and Egypt. Based on comparison between the two countries for adherence to biosecurity, it was observed that compliance levels on documentation of movement of poultry into or from the market (P = 0.02), control of movement of poultry into or from the market (P = 0.04), active poultry sellers' association (P < 0.0001), separation of birds by species (P = 0.05), compensation mechanism in place for culled birds (P = 0.001), traceability of origin of birds being sold (P = 0.03), hands washing after slaughter (P < 0.0001) and claims of hands disinfection after slaughter (P = 0.005) were significantly better in Nigeria than Egypt (Table 1) . However, Egypt performed significantly better in compliance with control of presence of wild birds (P < 0.0001), control of presence of pests (P < 0.0001), less other non-avian animals traded in the market (P < 0.0001), less wild animals traded in the market (P < 0.0001), mandatory routine disinfections of the markets (P < 0.0001) and alternative use of disinfectants in the markets (P = 0.05). All other parameters, such as monitoring of activities, specification of vehicle for transporting birds, formal training of operators, safe disposal of sick birds, good hygiene in the LBMs, live in dead out policy in place, are not significantly different among the LBMs in both countries (Table 1) .
Compliance with facility-related biosecurity
Generally, the result for the various biosecurity parameters in the LBMs for both countries show very low level of compliance but Egypt LBMs performed significantly better in compliance with appropriateness of location of the LBM to prevent human contacts (P < 0.01), disinfection facilities for trucks (P = 0.05) and access to facility to disinfect hands and shoes (P = 0.03) ( Table 2) . Significant P values are indicated in bold fonts.
Compliance with tools and equipment-related biosecurity
Biosecurity compliance scores for these items were generally below the acceptable levels with few exceptions (Table 3 ). For compliance with routine cleaning of cages (P = 0.0005), cleaning of equipments used for slaughtering (P < 0.0001) and protective materials worn by slaughter/processing persons (P < 0.0001), The LBMs in Nigerian performed better than the Egyptian LBMs but the markets in Egypt outperformed the Nigerian LBMs in the disinfection of equipments used for slaughtering (P = 0.02) ( Table 3) .
Logistic regression for risk factors analysis
Based on the cut off set for Tolerance and VIF, the final model is free from instability. A total of sixty one (61) Significant P values are indicated in bold fonts. 
Discussion
Our work has confirmed that compliance with biosecurity measures in the Nigerian and Egyptian
LBMs remains generally poor despite huge resource allocations, intense efforts and previous trainings conducted to support biosecurity implementation in these countries. Whereas LBM operators claimed to be practicing biosecurity measures, partial compliance were noticed in many of the operators shops. Pagani et al., (2008) have previously concluded that some biosecurity measures were poorly implemented while others were relatively well implemented in the Nigeria LBMs; our quantitative assessment supported the same assertion. However, because partial implementation and half-hearted compliance with biosecurity will limit the effort to control and eradicate outbreaks of rapidly spreading transboundary animal disease like HPAI H5N1, the continued endemicity of HPAI H5N1
and other influenza viruses in Egypt, as well as the resurgence of HPAI H5N1 in some other African countries may continue for the foreseeable future. Influenza viruses may persist in the LBM environment for weeks (Vong et al., 2008) and LBMs are suitable environments for potential virus reassortment (Nguyen et al., 2005; Kung et al., 2003; Cardona et al., 2009; Santhia et al., 2009; Wan et al., 2011 , FAO, 2013 Lockhart et al., 2015) and are known sources of human and animal infection (Cardona et al., 2009; Santhia et al., 2009; Wan et al., 2011) . In our study, approximately 39.4% of the surveyed markets were confirmed as infected.
Whereas three variables were protective for reducing the risk of infection of LBMs with the H5N1 virus including the mandatory routine disinfection of LBMs, hands washing after slaughter and traceability of origin of birds being sold in the LBMs, and previous workers have concluded similarly (Trock et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2015) , claims of hand disinfection after slaughter was surprisingly a strong risk factors. However, our field evaluations revealed that clear differences existed between the knowledge and applications of biosecurity implementation or hand disinfection (Conan et al., 2012; Saaan et al., 2012) . Many of the LBM operators utilise minimally applied or over-diluted sodium hypochlorite (bleach), chloroxylenol, halogenated phenols and phenolics, chlorhexidine and other such antiseptics and disinfectants. In addition, the over-exposure of such mixed chemicals to direct sunlight or overnight storage rendered them ineffective. In other cases, hands were not thoroughly cleaned before the application of hand disinfectants. The above may explain why a claim of hand disinfection was a risk factor rather than a protective factor for infection of LBMs with HPAI H5N1
virus.
The sale of wild animals and birds in the market was also a significant risk for infection of LBMs with HPAI H5N1 virus. In most part of Africa, wild animals and birds are trapped and delivered at the live animal markets without quarantine, routine health check and welfare evaluation (Abdelwhab et al., 2010 , Lee et al., 2010 , It is highly likely that some of these animals that are of different species may have been exposed to low-grade influenza infection or are reservoir of infections, and there is possibility of shedding the virus and contaminating the LBMs environment (Cardona et al., 2009 , CDC, 2015 . It becomes mandatory that regulations should be made concerning zoo-sanitary measures and where these exist, implementation to guide the sale of wild birds and animals in the LBMs in Africa must be ensured.
Although biosecurity trainings have been implemented in the LBMs in Nigeria and Egypt during past outbreaks of HPAI H5N1, LBM operators still adhere poorly to hygiene and health. Circumstantial evidence pointed to the fact that the level of literacy may influence adherence to biosecurity compliance, previous studies have confirmed that literacy levels affect human behaviour with consequent effect on knowledge of HPAI and biosecurity (Abbate et al., 2006 , Barennes et al., 2007 , Fasina et al., 2009 , Kuo et al., 2011 , Yu et al., 2013 . Intensive and reinforced training, as well as motivation for adherence to biosecurity will be required in LBMs to ensure reduction in burdens of influenza viruses (Magalhaes et al., 2010; Kuo et al., 2011; Manabe et al., 2012; Kurscheid et al., 2015) .
In view of the fact that the LBMs systems' adherence to compensation mechanism for culled birds was poorly implemented in both countries, it is recommended that a carefully structured compensation system with regular options for review should be in place in African countries. It has been confirmed that compensation encourages cooperation of LBM operators and other role players and supports voluntary reportage of outbreaks (Alders et al., 2009; Hunter et al., 2014) . To reduce financial losses, the LBM operators will rapidly sell sick poultry with implications for transmission of infection. However, compensation mechanism should be implemented with market reality as both under-compensation and overcompensation have produced unintended consequences that negatively affected animal disease control effort (World Bank, 2006; Mc Leod et al., 2016) .
While Pagani et al (2008) have recommended that there's a need for redesigning of LBMs in Nigeria, the poorly-designed markets continue to exist in Nigeria and Egypt (Anonymous, 2008; Fasina et al., 2016) with implications for human health due to very close human-animal contacts. Currently, most
LBMs are located within a much bigger general markets, in street corners in human locations and close to abattoir where poultry and other animals are slaughtered. We re-emphasise the need to put in place closed LBMs with infrastructures that support biosecurity compliance in countries within Africa where such is presently lacking (Kirunda et al., 2014) . Although the development partners and international organisations may play supportive roles in the institutionalisation of these developments, it remains the primary roles of the African government to implement the building of such facilities.
We observed that compliance to some biosecurity items was better than some others, for example, hand washing, cleaning of equipment used for slaughtering and cleaning of cages. Whether this observation is due to previous biosecurity training given or is purely associated with personal protection associated with the human food chain was not investigated. Kurscheid et al., (2015) , and other workers have stated that unless cleaning is thorough enough to remove all organic matters and disinfection is effective to penetrate and reach the microbes, transmission of the HPAI H5N1 infection cannot be prevented (Kilpatrick et al., 2006; Yee et al., 2008) .
Because most of the policy and regulation-related biosecurity as well as facility-related biosecurity were poorly adhered to, we advocated a need for more veterinary infrastructures and services in African LBMs to monitor traceability, regulate traffic in live poultry, assess birds both pre-mortem and post-mortem in the LBMs (Magalhaes et al., 2010) and is correlated with formal education/training, which is in consonance with findings of Kuo et al., (2011) and Manabe et al., (2012) .
Overall, the weekly LBMs performed better than the daily LBMs in terms of policy and regulations, facility, and tools and equipment-related biosecurity. It is possible that the reduced frequency of operations in the LBMs and rest days played roles in this observation (Fournie et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2015) .
In conclusion, we have confirmed that the roles of poultry traders, collectors, vendors and other LBM operators remain crucial to reducing the persistence, transmission and circulation of avian influenza viruses through increased biosecurity standards at poultry markets (Desvaux et al., 2011 , Sims, 2012 , Fourmie et al., 2013 . In addition, operators in the LBMs are at risk of infection with H5N1 virus due to their daily contact with birds, and they can inadvertently transmit the HPAI virus to birds from market. The use of participatory epidemiology using multidisciplinary task team is highly recommended to enable the LBM operators adopt biosecurity measures as own initiative. Government legislation should include bottom-up approach and surveillance (active, passive and risk-based) and sero-monitoring should be a routine exercise at the LBMs. 
